Hastings Center Report, Volume 52, Issue S1, Page S3-S11, March‐April 2022.

This chapter contains sections titled: Greece Rome Conclusion Notes.

PurposeThe main purpose of this study is to assess the effects of COVID-19 on the restaurant businesses of Bangladesh. It examines the socio-economic impacts of the humanitarian disaster of the COVID-19 pandemic from the perspective of restaurant owners. The study also intends to provide recommendations to mitigate effects on the restaurant business.Design/Methodology/ApproachA qualitative research approach was adopted to explore the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the restaurant businesses of Bangladesh. A total of 22 in-depth interviews were conducted with the (...) top-ranked restaurant owners in the Rajshahi City Corporation area of Bangladesh. Thematic analysis technique was applied for analyzing the collected data.FindingsThe study found that the restaurant owners were compelled to reduce their number of employees, and forced to ensure social distancing and proper sanitization which increased the expenses. Although online orders and home delivery services have increased significantly, restaurant business operation is gradually turning critical owing to the lack of financial support. Thus, restaurant owners urge the govenrment for financial assistance.Research Limitations/ImplicationsSince this research only focused on one city in Bangladesh, the outcomes of study may have a dearth of generalizability. Hence, the investigators are encouraged to extend the study area.Practical ImplicationsThis study will help restaurant owners and policymakers in formulating contemporary business policies and strategies. Thus, it will be supportive of improving the present condition of the restaurant businesses in developing countries like Bangladesh.Originality/ValueThis paper identified the truculent scenario of the restaurant business during the COVID-19 pandemic. (shrink)

Since the introduction and widespread adoption of chemical herbicides, “weed management” has become almost synonymous with “herbicide management.” Over-reliance on herbicides and herbicide-resistant crops has given rise to herbicide resistant weeds. Integrated weed management (IWM) identifies three strategies for weed management— biological-cultural, chemical-technological, mechanical-physical—and recommends combining all three to mitigate herbicide resistance. However, adoption of IWM has stalled, and research to understand the adoption of IWM practices has focused on single stakeholder groups, especially farmers. In contrast, decisions about weed management (...) often occur within a social ecosystem where multiple stakeholder groups co-create knowledge and practices. To more holistically investigate perceptions and decision-making related to herbicide resistant weed management, we conducted 23 in-depth interviews in combination with Q methodology with farmers and public-/private-sector agricultural professionals in the state of Georgia (U.S.). Our investigation focused on the management of an increasingly herbicide resistant weed, Palmer amaranth, which enabled broader conversations about agricultural systems, farmer livelihoods, and sustainability. Factor and thematic analyses allowed us to identify and characterize two distinct typologies: one primarily valued agronomic efficiency and relied upon chemical-technological management practices, while the other valued diversifying weed management strategies as the pathway to agronomic and economic success. Typologies diverged substantially in attitudes toward the three weed management strategies, the role of technology, and systems management generally. These two viewpoints have implications for how we understand underlying stakeholder motivations and choices around weed management strategies, both of which are crucial in promoting and supporting farmer use of diverse, ecologically-sound, weed management strategies. (shrink)

Tarski's argumentative use of the liar paradox is well-known, but officially it is the Grelling paradox that has final pride of place in Tarski's argument, not the Liar at all. Tarski explicitly gives argumentation that adverts to the liar argument, but it is an alternative argument—one he only hints at and which adverts to the Grelling—which he says has the advantage of removing any empirical element. In this paper, we will examine how the Grelling might be used in place of (...) the Liar in Tarski's argument for his exact indefinability thesis, and assess in what way the difference might be significant. If successful, Tarski's use of the Grelling puts pressure on how Convention T can be justified. (shrink)

Biological evolution provides a creative fount of complex and subtle adaptations, often surprising the scientists who discover them. However, because evolution is an algorithmic process that transcends the substrate in which it occurs, evolution’s creativity is not limited to nature. Indeed, many researchers in the field of digital evolution have observed their evolving algorithms and organisms subverting their intentions, exposing unrecognized bugs in their code, producing unexpected adaptations, or exhibiting outcomes uncannily convergent with ones in nature. Such stories routinely reveal (...) creativity by evolution in these digital worlds, but they rarely fit into the standard scientific narrative. Instead they are often treated as mere obstacles to be overcome, rather than results that warrant study in their own right. The stories themselves are traded among researchers through oral tradition, but that mode of information transmission is inefficient and prone to error and outright loss. Moreover, the fact that these stories tend to be shared only among practitioners means that many natural scientists do not realize how interesting and lifelike digital organisms are and how natural their evolution can be. To our knowledge, no collection of such anecdotes has been published before. This paper is the crowd-sourced product of researchers in the fields of artificial life and evolutionary computation who have provided first-hand accounts of such cases. It thus serves as a written, fact-checked collection of scientifically important and even entertaining stories. In doing so we also present here substantial evidence that the existence and importance of evolutionary surprises extends beyond the natural world, and may indeed be a universal property of all complex evolving systems. (shrink)

Alfred Tarski’s work on truth has played such a central role in the discourse on truth that most coming to it for the first time have probably already heard a great deal about what is said there. Unfortunately, since the work is largely technical and Tarski was only tan- gentially philosophical, a certain incautious assimilation dominates many philosophical discussions of Tarski’s ideas, and so, examining Tarski on the concept of truth is in many ways an act of unlearning. -/- In (...) this paper I focus on those key ideas in Tarski’s work that have made a lasting impact on the philosophical discourse. These are the notions of T-sentence, Convention T, Tarskian truth definition, and Tarski’s general limiting theses on the expressibility and definability of truth. Though these ideas are in name familiar, we will seek in this essay to uncover and remove certain widespread misunderstandings of each. Tarski’s name also features prominently in discussions of the liar paradox, so we will take time out to explain Tarski’s connection to this ancient puzzle. (shrink)

This paper has three modest aims: to present a puzzle, to show why some obvious solutions aren’t really “easy outs”, and to introduce our own solution. The puzzle is this. When it was small and had waterlogged streets, Toronto carried the moniker ‘Muddy York’. Later, the streets were drained, it grew, and Muddy York officially changed its name to ‘Toronto’. Given this, each premise in the following argument seems true. Yet the conclusion is a contraction. P1: Muddy York = Toronto (...) P2: Muddy York evolved into Toronto P3: The context “__ evolved into Toronto” is transparent, i.e., it allows substitution of co-referring singular terms P4: It’s not the case that Toronto evolved into Toronto C1: Toronto evolved into Toronto [By P1, P2 and P3] C2: Toronto both did and did not evolve into Toronto [By P4 and C1]. (shrink)

How do I handle difficult family members? What do I do if I can’t control my emotions? When do I correct others, and when do I hold my tongue? Too often we are late in realizing that we mishandled a situation, causing both resentment and frustration. But what if you could approach every situation with the mind of Christ? Distilled from his decades of experience as a clinical psychologist and a practicing Catholic, Dr. Ray Guarendi, popular radio and TV host, (...) offers here dozens of bite-sized reflections that combine sound spiritual advice with the best of modern psychology. Dr. Ray will help you address countless daily problems and create a plan of action for your most common troubles. With his trademark frankness and humor, Dr. Ray tackles all the topics that too often bring confusion and heartache, including: What to do when you’re easily offendedCommon excuses parents make for bad behavior in their children—and themselvesThe difference between speaking your mind and losing your emotions.The fine line between being a confident evangelist and being a jerk?What you should do when emotions overwhelm you?How to hold your children to high standards without causing resentmentThe difference between making an excuse and justifying an actionHow to tell people you’re angry without being nasty about it.What true humility is – and isn’t. Thinking Like Jesus is more than a self-help book. It will place you firmly into the mindset of a disciple of Christ so you can focus your attention on God and, ultimately, what it will take to spend eternity with Him in heaven. (shrink)

Mature rats were kept on protein-deficient diets to test the hypothesis that late-onset protein restriction results in deficits and to determine the feasibility of doing nutrition-behavior research with old naive animals. A 3% low-protein (LP) group and a 24% adequate-protein (AP) pair-fed control were used. Body weights and plasma protein concentrations were lower and exploratory behavior and motor coordination were poorer for LP rats. Both groups preferred the 24% protein diet. LP rats habituated slower and failed to overcome an initial (...) black preference on an oddity discrimination learning task. Nutrition-behavioral research with older rats is feasible, and late-onset protein restriction produces psychobiological deficits. (shrink)

In this thorough compendium, nineteen accomplished scholars explore, in some manner the values they find inherent in the world, their nature, and revelence through the thought of Frederick FerrZ. These essays, informed by the insights of FerrZ and coming from manifold perspectives—ethics, philosophy, theology, and environmental studies, advance an ambitious challenge to current intellectual and scholarly fashions.

According to Timothy Williamson 's epistemic view, vague predicates have precise extensions, we just don't know where their boundaries lie. It is a central challenge to his view to explain why we would be so ignorant, if precise borderlines were really there. He offers a novel argument to show that our insuperable ignorance ``is just what independently justified epistemic principles would lead one to expect''. This paper carefully formulates and critically examines Williamson 's argument. It is shown that the argument (...) does not explain our ignorance, and is not really apt for doing so. Williamson 's unjustified commitment to a controversial and crucial assumption is noted. It is also argued in three different ways that his argument is, in any case, self-defeating – the same principles that drive the argument can be applied to undermine one of its premises. Along the way, Williamson 's unstated commitment to a number of other controversial doctrines comes to light. (shrink)

The concept of social capital refers to the ways in which people make use of their social networks in "getting ahead." Social capital isn't just about the connections in networks, but fundamentally concerns the distribution of resources on the basis of exchanges. This volume focuses on how social capital interacts with social institutions, based on the premise that markets, communities, and families are the major contexts within which people meet and build up social networks and the foci to create social (...) capital. Featuring innovations in thinking about exchange mechanisms, resource distribution, institutional logics, resource diversity, and the degree of openness or closure of social networks, these chapters present some of the most important advances in this essential field. Paralleling these theoretical developments, the chapters also improve practical methodological work on social capital research, using new techniques and measurement methods for the uncovering of social logics. (shrink)

This book assesses how Vatican II opened up the Catholic Church to encounter, dialogue, and engagement with other world religions. Opening with a contribution from the President of the Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue, Cardinal Jean-Louis Tauran, it next explores the impact, relevance, and promise of the Declaration Nostra Aetate before turning to consider how Vatican II in general has influenced interfaith dialogue and the intellectual and comparative study of world religions in the postconciliar decades, as well as the contribution (...) of particular past and present thinkers to the formation of current interreligious and comparative theological methods. Additionally, chapters consider interreligious dialogue vis-à-vis theological anthropology in conciliar documents; openness to the spiritual practices of other faith traditions as a way of encouraging positive interreligious encounter; the role of lay and new ecclesial movements in interreligious dialogue; and the development of Monastic Interreligious Dialogue. Finally, it includes a range of perspectives on the fruits and future of Vatican’s II’s opening to particular faiths such as Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism. (shrink)

In this thorough compendium, nineteen accomplished scholars explore, in some manner the values they find inherent in the world, their nature, and revelence through the thought of Frederick Ferré. These essays, informed by the insights of Ferré and coming from manifold perspectives—ethics, philosophy, theology, and environmental studies, advance an ambitious challenge to current intellectual and scholarly fashions.

One establishes oneself within science from the start. One does not reconstitute it from scratch. One does not found it. Alain Badiou, Le Concept de modèle1 [T]here are no crises within science, nor can there be, for science is the pure affirmation of difference. Alain Badiou, "Marque et manque" 2.

This paper concerns a key point of decision in Donald Davidson's early work in philosophy of language — a fateful decision that set him and the discourse in the area on the path of truth-theoretic semantics. The decision of moment is the one Davidson makes when, in the face of a certain barrier, he gives up on the idea of constructing an explicit meaning theory that would parallel Tarski's recursive way with truth theory. For Davidson there was little choice: he (...) tells us he does not see how to deal with the difficulty except in the radical way he proposes. But there is a way to give such a meaning theory — a meaning theory proper which, using classical logic only, meets a meaning-theoretic analogue of Convention T, satisfies Davidson’s three key desiderata for a theory of meaning, reflects linguistic competence, and avoids quantifying over meanings. The meaning theory sketched here uses Tarskian strategies, as Davidson proposed, but differs from Davidson's approach in not going by way of a truth theory for the target language. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A FAOT ABOUT THE VIRTUES A. CHADWICK RAY Oentrai OoUege Peila, Iowa PHILIPPA FOOT remarks in Virtues and Vices that "with the nota;ble exception of Peter Gea;ch hardly 100.yone sees ·any difficulty in the thought that virtues may sometimes be di·splayed in bald ructions." 1 That a man may use his courage to deplorable ends; that 'a tea.ah.er ma.y show charity in igiving a miudent undeserved credit-these seem to (...) ibe hardly problema.tic possibilities. Yet Aquinas upholds •a definition of morrul virtue as " a good quality o[ the mind, by which we live rightly, of whioh no one cain make bad use,..."2 And Aristotle's conception of the man Ol:f p:riactica:l reason as the standard of moral virtue likewise seems to p!'lec1ude a virtue 's being misused.3 Times change, and rupparently eV'en virtue is not what it used to be. Nevertheless I mean here to survey the resour.ces of moral psyichology in the tradition of.Airistotle to see what sort of grounding can be found for the no-bad-use thesis. Presumably Geach stamds wlmost 1 afone today on this question, because the more traditional view would seem defensible only if it is taken as analytic. We could stipulate that an action wilil be called virtuous only if on balance it is the wisest alternative aivaifaible to the agent, but the utility of such a l Philippa Foot, Virtues and Vices (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 15. In After Virtue (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), 216, Macintyre finds Hume, Kant, Mill, and Rawls taking virtues as dispositions to conform to certain rules. To the extent that rules are unreliable, the virtues will be too. 2 Aquinas, Summa theoiogiae, I-II, q.55, a.4. a Aristotle, Nioomaohean Flthios 1106b36-7a2, 1113a30-31. 430 A. CHADWICK RAY concept would be doubtfrnl, and 'virtue' would seem to name no real thing. The'1'e are, after aH, appwrently anomalous cases, as wihen a teacher is moved to indulgence by an undeserving student's plea and seems to show kindness to a fault. The deifense oif the no-bad-use thesis requires us to deny that real kindness is shown here. But if no better justification for the denia~ can be offered than that the action is wrong and so cannot be virtuous, the thesis wil:l express only an a11bitrary decision about how to use 'virtue ' and related terms. But if such deni1als can he justified by appeal to facts about human nature, then the no.:brud-use thesis itself may perhaps be taken a;s descriptive of certain realities constitutive of human life. After considel'ing some of the conditions of vir:tuous action and the possibility of degrees of virtue (section III), I shaill argue (IV and V) that the opening sentence of Aristotle 's Nicomachean Ethics affords a bctua:l ba;sis for sustaining the no-had-use thesis as descriptive of virtues as we find them; that if "every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good " is perhaps an overstatement, still the humanness and intelligibility of an action would seem to depend on its aiming at some good; and that it is largely by trying to consider actions independently of the goods they aim a;t that we imagine virtues able to se1we unworthy ends. Payffig fuH rega11d to the purposiveness of human action and the desires expressed in it will also make it possible (VI) to avnid oonoluding with Aristotle that the virtues are inseparable from eaich other. I conclude (VII) with some brief refteetion on the meaning of my departures from Aristotle. Before offering my own interpretation of the Aristotelian resources, though, I briefly contend for the reality of moral virtues (as tiraditiona1ly understood ) against conventioIJJa1ist interpretations ('section I) and then (H) consider an ailtemative account (roughly Geach's) of the nature of the virtues that would sa¥e the no-bad-use thesis. A FACT ABOUT THE VIRTUES 431 I. Virtues as Teleological Di8}Jositions Why indeed speak of vi1rtues at a1l? Behavior would seem to be describahle and e:x:p1a... (shrink)

The pain -- I thought church would be different -- The pain goes so deep -- Where does all this pain come from? -- Nobody sees me -- I feel beat up in church -- I live in shame all the time -- I feel used -- I can't forgive -- The hope -- Will I ever get past the pain? -- Why do I feel so unsafe in church? -- I can't keep up with all the rules -- What's (...) wrong with these people? -- I just need to be perfect -- The church doesn't seem to care -- How do I find a good church? -- Hope beyond the pain -- Demonic lies and doctrines -- Learning to live in the kingdom of light. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Notes and Discussions Moore's Moral Rules Since the publication of Tom Regan's Bloomsbury'sProphet:G. E. Moore and the Development of His Moral Philosophy (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986) a controversy has arisen concerning Moore's practical ethical theory. According to Regan, Moore was Bloomsbury's "liberator" whose Principia Ethica provided the rationale for ignoring the conventional rules of morality (except for "a very few") in favor of personal choice. This, says Regan, (...) is the "central thesis" of Principia. Against Regan's interpretation Avrum Stroll (JHP 26:3, July 1988: 5o4-5o5) insists that Regan's evidence is "exiguous" and that "a careful reading of [Principia's] Chapter 5 shows that Moore argues that.., we ought alwaysto follow the dictates of common morality." In a similar vein Thomas Baldwin (Mind, Jan. 1988:129-33 ) claims that Regan's thesis rests upon "a misreading of a passage in [Chapter 5 of] Principia Ethica" and yields an interpretation of Moore which asserts "the opposite" of what Moore actually says. In what follows I wish to examine the crucial passages of Principia to determine just what Moore's view is and whether Regan is indeed guilty of misreading. Because of the severe limitations regarding our knowledge of cause and effect, the most, according to Moore, that we can obtain in practical ethics, is knowledge that "one kind of action will generallyproduce better effects than another."' And this leads him to consider the justification of the rules of common morality. On pp. 162-63 Moore does say that of "any rule which is generally useful, we may assert that it ought alwaysto be observed... [and that] though we may be sure that there are cases where the rule should be broken, we can never know which those cases are, and ought, therefore, never to break it." But, as the text reveals, this assertion is preceded by the hypothesis "/f/t is certainthat in a large majority of cases the observance of a certain rule is useful" (162, emphasis added). Indeed, Moore's discussion on pp. 162-64 is focused explicitly on "those actions as to which some general rule is certainlytrue'' (162, emphasis added). So what sorts of rules are those? Moore has already said on p. 16o: "it seems possible to prove a definite utility in most of those which are in general both recognised and practised." And just which rules are both recognized and practiced? They are those which he frequently refers to as "the rules most universally recognised by Common G. E. Moore, PrincipiaEthica(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), 155. Hereafter cited by page number alone. [595] 596 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 98:4 OCTOBER 199 ~ Sense" (156-57). He says that for "most" of these their general utility can be "established " and is "capable of proof" (t 55-56). His examples are rules concerning murder, respect for property, industry, temperance, and keeping promises (156-57). ~ Now, assuming that what is established or capable of proof is, in Moore's parlance, "certain," and taking the moral rules of Common Sense to be roughly what Stroll means by "common morality," we can see that StroU's assertion that "Moore argues that.., we ought always to follow the dictates of common morality" is not quite correct. At most Moore seems to be saying that we ought always to follow the dictates of "most" of common morality. But even this is too strong, because Moore's phrase "the rules most universally recognised by Common Sense" suggests that Common Sense morality may include rules which are not "universally recognised," and hence, less than certain. Also, Moore says that "a great part of ordinary moral exhortation.., consists in the advocating of rules not generally practised." If Moore holds that common morality does indeed inclucJe a significant portion of rules which are neither universally recognized nor generally practiced, then even the claim that he argues that we ought always to follow most of its dictates seems questionable. As Regan observes, Moore goes on in Chapter 5 to say some things which confirm our doubts and make it very difficult to accept Strolrs assertion, even in its modified form. For Moore seems to say... (shrink)